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INTRODUCTION
The diffuse climate of change management and the associated waves of reforms in the public sector have resulted in pressure on many public organisations and local governments from a variety of sources to improve their accountability and performance (McAdam, Hazlett and Casey, 2005) .
Among these reforms, often positioned under the New Public Management (NPM) umbrella, performance measurement (PM) has arisen as a way to make managers accountable and improve organisational performance. In particular, some authors argue that PM systems are becoming one of the main pervasive aspects of organizational life, especially in the public sector, where they have been emphasized as a substitute for market pressure for organizations that operate without market competition (Hood, 1991 . Consequently, new management practices have been introduced aiming to improve both the quality of the services provided and their overall performance (Radnor and McGuire, 2004, McAdam, Hazlett, and Casey, 2005) . Within this wave of change, particularly emphasis has been given to the introduction of pay-forperformance (PfP) schemes, which are appealing because they help to make civil servants more accountable than before since the results to be achieved must be defined ex-ante and monitored both throughout and ex-post (Ketelaar, Manning, and Turkisch, 2007) . Although some studies provide preliminary evidence that the emphasis on performance measures and goal attainment can be a motivating factor in the private as well as in the public sector (Latham, Borgogni, and Petitta, 2008), therefore finding a positive association between the use of PM system and organizational performance (Gomes et al., 2017) , other researchers are skeptical about the effectiveness of these practices, claiming that the complexity of public institutions may negatively affect PfP systems and cause significant dysfunctional effects (Glynn and Murphy, 1996 Building on this debate, this study contributes to the debate on the impact of PfP on organisational performance and provides original empirical evidence in a country where the NPM reform is an ongoing issue. The article focuses on Italian local governments and tests whether the percentage of total pay linked to performance (variable compensation) granted to executives affects the organisations' future performance. A unique set of data on the compensation structure of executives from 105 Italian local governments over the period 2010-2013 is used. Italy's Treasury Department provided detailed information about the composition of local managers' pay, which was matched with a comprehensive performance score obtained from an independent Italian business newspaper that each year ranks Italy's local governments on their performance along six dimensions (standard of living, services and environment, employment level, law and order, population, leisure). Importantly, in contrast to most of the earlier research, our study does not use selfreported scores of performance but measures performance using a third-party independent ranking. Using a regression analysis, a positive and significant association between the percentage of variable compensation and future performance is documented. Therefore, the results suggest that the implementation of PfP schemes in public organisations has the potential to positively affect organisation's future performance. Additional analyses show that this result is not driven by the amount of managers' total compensation but it is specific to the compensation's structure.
This study extends research on public sector organisations in several ways. First, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is one of the first studies investigating the effectiveness of PfP schemes in public organisations using an external and independent performance score. Thus, concerns related to relying on performance variables reported by internal managers or politicians are addressed (Binderkrantz and Christensen, 2012; Spleklè and Verbeeten, 2014) . Second, in contrast to most prior research (Newberry and Pallot, 2004; Verbeeten, 2008; Weibel, Rost and Osterloh, 2010; Binderkrantz and Christensen, 2012) this study investigates the association between public organizations' performance and reward systems using a large-scale sample instead of a case study methodology or a meta-analysis, thus it complements earlier studies that use other research methods. Third, this research contributes to the debate on the diffusion of PfP in local governments. The majority of the extant research in this area addresses the development of PM systems and PfP schemes in central governments ( (Gomes et al., 2017) .
We believe that the focus on local governments in studying the effectiveness of PfP systems represents a notable contribution for several reasons. First, local governments in all OCED countries have similar administrative and service delivery responsibilities, so they provide a homogeneous research setting (Mussari and Caperchione, 2000) . Second, they can autonomously organise their internal resources and processes, so they are a good setting to test the relationship between PfP systems and performance. Third, extant research on PfP schemes in local governments primarily focuses on the operational development of PM systems, placing little emphasis on their effectiveness (Kloot and Martin, 2000; Pollanen, 2005) .
The paper is organised as follows. The next two sections present the theoretical background, followed by the hypothesis. In the third section, a summary of the main performance measurement initiatives adopted by the Italian local government is proposed. In the fourth section, the research design and the data used are described. Results are discussed in the fifth section and finally concluding remarks and limitations are presented.
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
In most OECD countries the introduction of PM systems has been strictly related to new accountability dimensions because these systems help increasing transparency about the results achieved and become a fundamental issue in the provision of high-quality public services (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992 ; Guthrie and English, 1997; Radnor and McGuire, 2004; Pollanen, 2005; Ketelaar, Manning, and Turkisch, 2007) . This new form of managerial accountability, which deals with the achievement of designated targets, has changed the traditional forms of public accountability, such as political, financial, professional and administrative accountability (Glynn and Murphy, 1996) , to become more focused on monitoring resources and achieving results, rather than on defending the procedures and norms involved in the delivery of services. While the previous forms of accountability were not effective in holding public servants accountable for their actions (Glynn and Murphy, 1996) Few studies that try to investigate the relationship between the use of PfP systems and performance of public organisations, providing contrasting evidence although a variety of research methods used.
Examining the Malaysian personal and budgeting policies, Siddiquee (2010) sheds light on the introduction of a remuneration system that links individual performance to pay. The author shows that, because of discrepancies between policies and practices, the innovation did not produce the desired impacts in terms of either resource savings or performance improvement. Using the Danish central government as a research setting and information on performance reported by Danish agencies, Binderkrantz and Christensen (2012) test the incentive effect of PfP schemes to improve public-sector performance and find no evidence of a positive relationship between goal achievement and pay to agency heads (measured both in terms of bonuses and total salary). In addition, their data reveal a positive and significant relationship between total executive pay and the agency's experience on performance contracting (that is the number of years during which agencies have had performance contracts). The authors contend that the absence of a positive relationship between executive compensation and performance could be due to the multitasking nature of the executives' work, which makes it difficult to design a compensation scheme that takes into consideration all of the activities they perform. On the other hand, Mulvaney, McKinney and Grodsky (2012) argue that the application of a PfP system is an effective method for motivating employees and increasing their performance, observing that it introduces "justice" into human resource management by rewarding employees in proportion to their contribution to overall performance. Perry, Engbers, and Jun (2009) and Frey (2013) perform a systematic review of the debate concerning public-service motivation and PfP systems: they find inconclusive results, although they argue that these schemes may produce negative effects in publicservice organizations because of their incompatibility with institutional rules and the intrinsic motivation that characterizes public employees. Using the same line of reasoning, Moynihan (2010) claims that the application of PfP systems to complex public services may damage employees' motivation because of a crowding-out effect, leading to a loss of interest in the job, reduced effort in performing the tasks at hand and overall lower performance (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999; Moynihan, 2007; Langbein, 2010; Binderkrantz and Christensen, 2012; Arnaboldi, Lapsley, and Steccolini, 2015). Nonetheless, some studies do not exclude the possibility that employees in the public sector may respond to monetary incentives as predicted by focusing on measured results and financial bonuses (Moynihan, 2008) . As a result, whether PfP systems have a positive impact on performance in public organisations remains the subject of debate (Binderkrantz and Christensen, 2012).
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The relationship between PfP systems and performance in public organisations can be studied building on two theoretical perspectives: the agency theory and the cognitive evaluation theory (Frey, 2013) . The agency theory argues that managers in the public sector are agents of the politicians (just as managers in private firms are agents for shareholders) and that they are usually better informed about their organizations' characteristics than the politicians are, in terms of resources available, internal processes, goals achieved and general conditions of the organization. For this reason, they should be exempted from traditional bureaucratic controls so they can manage the organisation effectively, while the alignment of interests between managers and politicians should be obtained through careful specification and monitoring of performance, along with incentives (Newberry and Pallot, 2004) . Overall, agency theory advocates that monetary incentives work by increasing individual effort, which leads to increased individual and organisational performance (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002) . Even if in the public sector there may be multiple-agent relationships (Mayston, 1993) , many authors claim that these mechanisms are expected to work as well in the public sector as in the private sector (Newberry and Pallot, 2004; Binderkrantz and Christensen, 2012) . In particular, PfP systems are seen as a managerial tool that can change public employees' culture and improve the quality of the services provided by shifting attention from traditional rules and input regulation to management by objective and goal-setting, thereby improving public-sector performance (Glynn and Murphy, 1996; Hvidman and Andersen, 2014). Thus, under this perspective, PfP systems are expected to improve public organisations' performance.
In contrast, the cognitive motivation theory focuses on the "satisfaction an individual derives from involvement in an activity without external rewards" (Frey, 2013, p. 953 ) and on the crowding-out of this satisfaction that results from the introduction of monetary incentives. The cognitive motivation theory addresses the psychological complexities of individual behaviours and sheds light on the underlying forces that lead an individual to increase effort and improve performance. Deci et al. (1999) argue that financial incentives, including performance-related incentives, reduce intrinsic motivation. In particular, the literature that criticises the traditional agency theory framework, as it is applied to the public sector, argues that public agents do not get utility solely from monetary incentives, as they are motivated intrinsically by the organisation's ethical purposes or by the agent's professionalism (Dixit, 2002; Moynihan, 2007) . Overall, the theory does not clarify whether PfP systems increase performance in the public sector as agency theory and cognitive motivation theory predict different relationships between PfP schemes and performance. Moreover, many public administration scholars, political scientists, and practitioners have agreed that public organisations have more ambiguous and hard-to measure goals than private organisations do (Langbein, 2010; Jung, 2011) , and this might cause PfP systems to be ineffective when applied to public organisations. Given the above-mentioned contradictory predictions, we investigate the following non-directional research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Pay-for-performance is associated with future performance in public organisations
RESEARCH SETTING AND DATA
This paper tests the main hypothesis using Italy as research setting and focusing on the largely unexplored setting of local governments.
Local governments represent an ideal research setting to test our hypothesis for several reasons. First, local governments in all OCED countries have similar administrative and service delivery responsibilities, so they provide a homogeneous research setting (Mussari and Caperchione, 2000) . Thus, results can be more easily generalised. Second, local governments can autonomously organise their internal resources and processes, so they are a good setting in which to test the relationship between PfP systems and performance. Third, the Italian setting provides useful data at the local government level. Specifically, we obtained:
 detailed compensation data for the managers of each local government that distinguishes between total compensation and the pay-for-performance component of compensation, allowing us to compute the percentage of managers' compensation that is linked to performance;
 an objective measure of the local government's performance that is obtained from an independent third party. Therefore, this study does not have to rely on self-reported scores of performance and it can measure performance in a consistent way within the sample.
Italy is a civil-law country, where regulative power has a fundamental role in reforming public-sector organizations (Liguori, 2012) , local governments are defined as organisations that represent the community, protect its interests and promote its development. In order to achieve these important aims, a new organisational function, the (local) manager, was introduced and her activity should be assessed by the results achieved. Moreover in 1993 and 1995, new decrees (No. 29 and No. 77, respectively) required the introduction of detailed managerial "devices" like accrual accounting, management control systems, strategic plans, executive budgeting and new financial reports, integrated within a new emphasis on human resources and top organizational functions (both political and managerial). More recently, Act No. 150 of 2009 required local governments to identify and develop a "performance cycle" with a strong focus on individual and organizational performance related to the results achieved., The political board of each local government yearly identify performance objectives assigned to top managers and as a consequence local managers receive yearly a part of their salary depending on the performance targets achieved. In this way, this new act strengthened local government's focus on performance issues and highlighted opportunities related to the use of PfP. It is clearly supposed that performance targets are different among local government and, within the same local government, among managers, although they are all defined to improve the well-being and the development of the local community (since this is the main purpose of each local government itself). For this reason, it is possible to compare the results achieved by different local governments along common dimensions, which represent traditional areas of intervention of local agencies. Therefore, this study focuses on the four-year period immediately after the introduction of Act No. 150 -that is, 2010 to 2013. In Italy, local governments are mainly divided into two levels: i) 107 Provinces and 8,045 Municipalities. Because of data availability, we focus our analysis at the Province level.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

Empirical Model
The hypothesis defined in the previous section is tested by using an ordinary least-squares (OLS) model. This model is commonly used in prior research investigating the relationship between executive compensation and performance. For instance, Mehran (1995) employs an OLS model to investigate the relationship between firm performance and managers' compensation structure for 153 manufacturing U.S. firms, while Core et al. (1999) adopt the same estimation model to analyse the impact of excess compensation on future firm performance. In our setting, the control variables are necessarily different from those used in the previous studies since we are focusing on local governments. Thus, the following OLS model with year fixed effects is estimated to test the research hypothesis:
where:  PERF is the natural logarithm of the performance score of the local government i, measured in year t +1
 PFP is the amount of compensation linked to the manager's performance in year t  SIZE is the size of the local government (inhabitants) in year t  FIN_PERF is the yearly surplus as measured by the budgetary accounting system and standardised by the number of habitants in year t  N_EXE is the natural logarithm of the number of managers in the local government standardised by the number of habitants in year t  ELECTIONS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a local election took place in that year, and 0 otherwise in year t  NEAST -northeast, NWEST-northwest and CENTER -center are dummies identifying geographical position of each local government.
To control for the effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the local government level. The year fixed effects included in the regression control for time trends that may affect managers' compensation and future performance.
Dependent Variable
The measures of local governments' performance rely on the annual national rank of Il Sole 24 ore, the most relevant Italian business newspaper funded in 1865 (it is referred to as "The Newspaper" thereafter). The Newspaper publishes a ranking of all local governments (Provinces) each year, measuring their performance along six key dimensions:
1. The standard of living; 2. Services and environment; 3. Employment level; 4. Law and order; 5. Population; 6. Leisure. As explained in the previous paragraph, these dimensions are consistent with main purposes of local governments because they should highlight increasing or decreasing in the development and well-being of each local community. The performance dimensions included in the score strictly reflect those reported in Law No. 267 of 2000, which establishes the primary objectives that local governments should pursue, so local governments' performance is measured in a consistent way. In contrast to most of the earlier research, this study does not use self-reported scores but measures performance using a third-party independent ranking. Each dimension is measured using six metrics, and a final score is obtained by equally weighting the scores for the six dimensions. The six performance dimensions provide a comprehensive assessment of the local government' performance in promoting the wellbeing of the community. For instance, the "standard of living dimension" investigates performance parameters such as the local GDP per habitant and the average pension benefits; the "service and environment" dimension focuses on the level of pollution and services offered to citizens (including healthcare); the "employment level" dimension includes measures such as the number of new corporations and the employment rate; the "law and order" dimension focuses on the number of extortions and robberies; the "population" dimension monitors parameters such as the population density; finally, the dimension "leisure" focuses on leisure opportunities offered to citizens such as libraries, theaters etc. PERF in the model (1) is computed as the natural logarithm of the performance score, and it is measured in the regression analysis in year t+1. Measuring performance one year ahead helps to mitigate reverse causality issues, which are an important source of endogeneity in our research setting.
Independent Variable
The research variable is the percentage of total compensation granted to the local governments' managers that is linked to performance (PfP). In order to obtain detailed data on the total amount and composition of managers' compensation, the authors contacted the Italy's Treasury Department and retrieved this piece of information for each local government.
Each local manager receives compensation in three forms:
1. Fixed salary, which is the portion of total salary that is granted to the manager by law and that does not depend on any performance outcome; 2. Role's salary, which is the portion of total compensation that is granted to the manager according to his or her role in the organisation's hierarchical structure and that does not depend on any performance outcome; 3. Pay-for-performance salary or variable compensation (PFP salary), which is the amount of compensation linked to the manager's performance. Performance targets are yearly defined by the political board.
The variable PfP in the model (1) is computed as follows:
Data used to compute PfP is based on the aggregated level of compensation provided to all managers of a given local government in a given year. Therefore, the variable PfP measures the average percentage of variable compensation granted to all managers in a given year.
Control Variables
To control for potential confounding effects, the regression model includes an array of variables that may affect the relationship between managers' variable compensation and performance. This piece of information was hand-collected by searching the website of each local government. If not available on the website, missing data have been retrieved by contacting a representative of the local government. Specifically, SIZE controls for the size of the local government (computed as the natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants), which previous studies usually consider to be correlated to NPM innovations, organizational complexity and visibility (Poister and Streib, 1999 
Sample Selection
Data on local governments' performance scores were collected from the The Newspaper's website for the period 2010-2014. Since performance is measured one year forward, the regression analysis uses data over the four-year period 2010-2013. This process provides a starting sample of 428 entity-year observations. The performance data were merged with information on managers' compensation obtained as previously described. Thirty entity-year observations were lost because of missing data -eleven in 2010, eight in 2011, six in 2012 and five in 2013. After all of the control variables to estimate model (1) were collected, a final sample of 398 entity-year observations resulted, generated from 105 unique local governments. Table 1 summarises the sample selection process and describes the distribution of observations over time. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. To ease interpretation, the variables in Table 2 are not reported in the logarithmic form and the variable N_EXE is multiplied by 1,000. In the sample, the mean (median) compensation linked to performance is 8.9 percent (9.1%), with substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity across local governments. Specifically, the (untabulated) lowest value in the sample is 0 percent, and the (untabulated) highest value is 27.7 percent. Results show a large cross-sectional variation on the performance score assigned to each province, which ranges from a minimum of 369.9 to a maximum of 626.0 (untabulated). The mean (median) performance score is 507.5 (520.6), the average number of managers is fourteen (median thirteen), and 18.3 percent of the observations are from years in which a local election took place. Finally, Table 2 reveals that the 45.5 percent of the observations are from local governments in northern Italy. Table 3 presents a preliminary univariate analysis that supports a positive relationship between PfP and local governments' performance. Specifically, Panel A shows the Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables included in the model (1). There is a strong and positive association between future performance and the percentage of PFP salary granted to the local governments' managers. This association, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, provides preliminary evidence for the research hypothesis. To determine the association between PfP and future performance at the univariate level, panel B of Table 3 classifies observations into quartiles according to the amount of variable compensation (PfP) and tabulates the mean and median values of future performance for the top and bottom quartiles. Results show that, in the presence of high variable compensation (top 25%), future performance is significantly higher than in the presence of low variable compensation (bottom 25%). The mean and median values of these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the results reported in Table 3 suggest that local governments whose managers have high percentages of variable compensation outperform those in which managers have low percentages of compensation linked to performance. 
Data Description
RESULTS
Additional Analyses
An alternative explanation for the results is that local governments using variable compensation to a larger extent also provide managers with higher total compensation than local governments that give managers low PfP compensation. Therefore, the results shown in Table 4 could be driven by the amount of total compensation granted to managers and not by the percentage of variable compensation. Since the study's research question is concerned with the effect on the performance of the composition of manager compensation and not the level of total compensation, this section explores this issue in detail. First, model (1) is estimated by substituting PfP with the logarithm of managers' total compensation (TOT_COMP); results are reported in Table 5 , Column 1. The coefficient on managers' total compensation is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the results documented in Table 4 are specific to managers' variable compensation and are not driven by the overall level of compensation. Table 5 , Column 2 also shows the results when both PfP and TOT_COMP are included in the regression model. The analysis shows that, while managers' variable compensation is positively and significantly associated with future performance, overall compensation has a negative relationship with future performance, perhaps because of entrenched managers who can extract excess compensation, which is linked to low future performance.
Overall, the results presented in the paper suggest that the larger the portion of variable compensation granted to managers, the better the local government's future performance. 
CONCLUSION
The NPM reform wave that involved most OECD countries brought high expectations for improvements in the public organisations' activities (Hughes, 1998; Guthrie, Olson, and Humphrey, 1999; Newberry and Pallot, 2004) . The replacement of the traditional model of administration with a management model closely related to that of the private sector meant a transformation in public organisations. While in the traditional model performance was secondary and considered too difficult to measure, the measurement and achievement of results at both the organisational and the individual level are today among pervasive in the majority of organisations (Hughes, 1998; Townley et al., 2003) . This important focus on results has led to the development of performance and personnel systems that encourage the assessment and achievement of goals. However, the PM systems introduced by the reforms have been controversial because of the complexity of the variety of accountability dimensions, engaged stakeholders, and cultural factors of each organisation (Guthrie and English, 1997; Verbeeten, 2008; Spleklè and Verbeeten, 2014) . In particular, incentives and performance-based rewards play a key role in performance measurement systems introduced in the public sector (Newberry and Pallot, 2004; Moynihan, 2007) . Although standard agency theory posits that performance incentives increase agents' productivity, cognitive evaluation theory asserts that performance incentives may diminish their intrinsic motivation and, as a result, their performance (Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Kunz and Pfaff, 2002; Moynihan, 2010 ). This concern is particularly important in local governments, where the intrinsic motivation, that refers to performing an activity with the goal of acting appropriately, is more relevant than it is in the private sector (Lindenberg, 2001; Moynihan, 2007; Frey, 2013) . Moreover local governments -and public-sector organisations generally -have special features that include complex interactions among multiple tasks and principals that may explain why a naive application of agency theory could be inappropriate (Dixit, 2002; Newberry and Pallot, 2004; Langbein, 2010; Moynihan, 2010) . Because of the scarcity of research on the application of PfP in (European) local governments, this paper focuses on the compensation structure of Italian local governments' managers to study the association between PfP schemes and future performance.
In order to address some of the limits of previous studies, this investigation adopts a regression analysis approach based on detailed information about local managers' reward structures and an external and independent measure of the local governments' performance. This research strategy facilitates the testing of an important research question left open by previous literature: whether the use of reward systems related to performance improves local governments' overall performance. The study uses a research setting in which performance can be measured in a consistent and objective way and detailed data on the composition of managers' compensation in local governments can be acquired.
While the accounting literature provides mixed evidence on the relationship between performance measurement systems and performance (Verbeeten, Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014) , the results of the present study suggest that there is a positive and significant association between PfP and future performance in local governments. In the light of extant literature, our results provide an important theoretical contribution as they document empirical support for the predictions of the agency theory when applied in the public sector setting. Specifically, this study reinforces claims in Verbeeten (2008) that the use of incentives is -under certain circumstancespositively associated with performance in public sector organisations. Moreover, the paper also corroborates findings in Perry et al. (2009) that managers' variable compensation, when set at significant levels, result in the desired effects.
Three important caveats to these results apply. First, the study documents an average effect of PfP systems; however -because of the research method used -this investigation is not able to gain insights on the process of defining and measuring the specific managerial objectives. Second, the focus on a single country means that the results may not be generalizable to countries with other kinds of institutional settings. The influence of national features on the central relationship is a fruitful research area that should be investigated. Finally, the presence of endogeneity does not allow causal inferences to be drawn, so results should be interpreted as documenting a positive and significant association between reward systems and performance, rather than as a causal link. Future research that exploits exogenous shocks in regulations to identify a causal link between compensation and performance in local governments is probably the most challenging but also the most promising avenue to pursue in this research field.
